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Felony Copyright Infringement in Schools 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much copying of books, magazine articles, and computer 
software occurs in educational settings. The unlawful copying 
of books, magazines, and software was at worst a misdemeanor 
offense until18 U.S.C. §2319 was amended by Public Law 102-
561 on October 28, 1992. This act extends federal felony penal-
ties to a broad range of copyright infringements, including the 
copying of books, magazine articles, and computer software. 
The press has shown a misunderstanding of these new 
criminal provisions. Articles have been printed which show 
great fear that the extension of felony penalties poses a serious 
risk to persons who are merely on the edge of fair use or who 
violate restrictions contained in unreasonable shrink-wrap 
license agreements. 1 
While copying for educational purposes is treated more 
leniently than copying for other purposes, liability can still 
occur. Public (but not private) school districts might be immune 
from suit under the 11th amendment. 2 Even if the district is 
immune, this immunity does not protect teachers, employees, 
or students.3 Under the fair use doctrine, copying for education-
al purposes is not an excuse, but is treated more leniently than 
copying for other purposes. 
There is as yet no case law on the amended 18 U.S.C. 
§2319, and how it may apply in schools. This paper will ana-
lyze the elements of the felony offense described by the new 
statute, define these elements through analogy to case law 
involving similar terms in both the civil law and criminal viola-
tions under the old statute,4 and predict likely sentences for 
1. "Under the new law, just about any computer department manager could 
be charged as a felon." Mitchell Kapor, Innocent Felons, FoRBES, 15 Feb. 1993 at 
208. 
2. See BV Engineering v. University of California, Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 
1394, (9th Cir. 1988) (State University immune from copyright infringement suit). 
Contra Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321 (D. Va. 1985) (State 
University liable for infringing copyright on photographs). 
3. See Withol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (11th Cir. 1962) (holding choir director 
personally liable for copyright infringement in school choir performance, but releas-
ing the school district from liability as a state agency under the 11th Amendment) 
(also holding church liable for unauthorized church choir performance). 
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those who violate the new statute. Finally, it will propose 
methods by which educators can avoid exposure of their stu-
dents and employees to federal felony penalties. 
II. CHANGES To THE STATUTE 
A. Prior Law 
The version of 18 U.S.C. §23195 enacted in 1982 provided 
penalties of up to five years in prison, or fines of up to 
$250,000, for a first offense of willful copyright infringement 
(as defined in 17 U.S.C. §506) involving producing or distribut-
ing for profit within a 180 day period 
(a) more than one thousand copies of sound recordings, or 
(b) more than sixty five copies of motion pictures or audiovisual 
works. Penalties of up to two years in prison, or fines of up to 
$250,000, were provided for a first offense of willful copyright 
infringement involving producing or distributing: (a)more than 
one hundred copies of sound recordings, or (b) more than seven 
copies of motion pictures or audiovisual works. All other willful 
copyright infringement was a misdemeanor with a maximum 
term of one year in prison and a $25,000 fine. Second offenses 
were subject to more stringent penalties. Under the old statute, 
felony copyright infringement was not likely in an educational 
setting because of these high quantity requirements and be-
cause the crime was limited to sound recordings, movies and 
audiovisual works. 
B. Legislative History 
A bill was introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch (Utah) to 
add computer software to the enumerated list of categories of 
copyrighted works for which felony penalties were available in 
18 U.S.C. §2319.6 Mter passage in the Senate, and hearings 
dominated by computer hardware and software representatives, 
the House Judiciary Committee substituted language that 
eliminated the list of enumerated categories of works in favor 
is necessary to resort to the civil law of copyright. See United States v. Wise, 550 
F.2d 1180, 1185-6 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding the predecessor statute to 17 U.S.C. 
§506(a))." United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987). 
5. (1988). 
6. Criminal Penalties for Copyright Infringement, H.R. REP. No. 102-997, 
102 Cong. (1992), Reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3569; hereinafter: House Re-
port. 
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of a test based on both quantity and value. The amended bill 
was then enacted. 
C. NewLaw 
The new law reads as follows: 
§ 2319. Criminal infringement of a copyright 
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal of-
fenses) of title 17 shall be punished as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section and such penalties shall be in addition to 
any other provisions of title 17 or any other law 
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) 
of this section-
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined 
in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the of-
fense consists of the reproduction or distribution, during 
any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, 
of 1 or more copyrighted works, with a retail value of 
more than $2500; 
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined 
in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the of-
fense is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph 
(1); and 
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in 
the amount set forth in this title, or both, in any other 
case. 
(c) As used in this section-
(1) the terms "phonorecord," and "copies" have, respec-
tively, the meanings set forth in section 101 (relating to 
definitions) of title 17; and 
(2) the terms "reproduction" and "distribution" refer to 
the exclusive rights of a copyright owner under clauses 
(1) and (3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclu-
sive rights in copyrighted works), as limited by sections 
107 through 120, of title 17.7 
The relevant portions of 17 U.S.C. §506, which defines the 
criminal offense, reads as follows: 
§ 506 Criminal Offenses 
(a) Criminal lnfringement.-Any person who infringes a copy-
right willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or 
7. 18 U.S.C.A. §2319 (West Supp. 1993). 
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private financial gain shall be punished as provided in section 
2319 of title 18. 
(b)Forfeiture and Destruction.-When any person is convicted 
of any violation of subsection (a), the court in its judgment of 
conviction shall, in addition to the penalty therein prescribed, 
order the forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all 
infringing copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, 
or equipment used in the manufacture of such infringing 
copies or phonorecords.8 
The new statute provides for a maximum imprisonment of 
up to five years for willful copyright infringement involving the 
production or distribution within any 180-day period of "at 
least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted 
works, with a retail value of more than $2500."9 This applies 
to any copyrighted work, including computer software, books, 
and magazines. The production of smaller quantities or values 
of material remains a misdemeanor. A second offense is pun-
ishable by a ten-year prison term. Fines are set by 18 U.S.C. 
§[chapter 227] 357110 as not more than $250,000 for a felony 
conviction, or not more than $100,000 for a misdemeanor con-
viction of an individual. Fines run up to double these amounts 
for conviction of an organization. Fines may also be computed 
as not more than twice the profits from the copyright infringe-
ment realized by the defendant, or twice the loss suffered by 
the copyright owner. 
17 U.S.C. §50711 sets a three-year statute of limitations 
for purposes of civil or criminal copyright infringement. 
III. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
A. Introduction 
Interpreting the new statute, the elements of the felony 
offense include: 
a. A Willful act of 
b. Copyright infringement, where distributed copies have not 
been the subject of a "first sale". 
c. Reproduction or distribution of ten or more copies or 
phonorecords within a 180-day period 
8. 17 U.S.C. §506 (1988). 
9. 18 U.S.C.A. §2319 (West Supp. 1993). 
10. (1988) (note: there are 2 sections 18 U.S.C. §3571). 
11. (1988). 
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d. Of one or more copyrighted works. 
e. A quantity reproduced or distributed amounting to a retail 
value of more than $2500 within the 180-day period. 
f. A purpose of commercial advantage or private financial 
gain. 
g. Charges must be filed within the three-year statute of 
limitations for copyright infringement. 
B. Meaning of Willful Copyright Infringement 
The term "willful" establishes the mens rea12 requirement 
for criminal copyright infringement. In most of the criminal 
law, a mens rea applies to performance of the act; for most 
crimes, a conviction may be obtained if the actor knowingly or 
recklessly committed an act likely to produce the forbidden 
result. Whether or not the criminal knew that the result was 
against the law, and whether or not he consulted his attorney 
first, are both immaterial. "The general rule that ignorance of 
the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecu-
tion is deeply rooted in the American legal system."13 
The term "willful" is not defined in the statute. The legisla-
tive history shows intent that the existing interpretations of 
this term should remain. 14 Nimmer on Copyright defines will-
ful to mean "with knowledge that the defendant's conduct con-
stitutes copyright infringement."15 Courts in civil cases, where 
willful is not a factor in liability, but is a factor in determining 
the amount of statutory damages, have held: 
An infringement is 'Willful' if the infringer knows that its 
conduct is an infringement or if the infringer has acted in 
reckless disregard of the copyright owner's right. See Interna-
tional Korwin Corp.v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 
1988), at 380 & n.10 (quoting Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. 
Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
The determination whether a particular infringer acted will-
fully is left to the trier of fact, although a finding of willful-
ness should ordinarily be made where the defendant knows 
that its conduct is an infringement or is reckless in not know-
ing that fact. Accordingly, willfulness would ordinarily be 
12. Mens rea is the required mental state for a crime. 
13. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). 
14. House Report at 3573. 
15. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§14.04[B], at 14-51 to 14-52 (1992). 
148 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1994 
demonstrated where the infringer is provided oral or written 
notice .... 16 
In criminal copyright cases the mens rea requirement is 
substantially tougher than for civil copyright infringement. For 
example, the Southern District of Indiana omitted the "reckless 
disregard" language of Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd./7 
using a much stricter jury instruction; "the word 'willfully' as 
used in the statute means the act was committed by a defen-
dant voluntarily, with knowledge that it was prohibited by law, 
and with the purpose of violating the law, and not by mistake, 
accident, or in good faith."18 In United States v. Cross, FBI 
agents visited a store while investigating previous complaints, 
explained the statute to the defendants, and warned them of 
possible civil or criminal liability, all before the acts of infringe-
ment for which the defendants were convicted! 
Where an infringer relied upon advice of counsel that his 
planned acts were not likely to produce copyright infringement, 
that bad advice was held not to be a defense against criminal 
charges of copyright infringement, but to be admissible as a 
factor that should be considered in determining whether the in-
fringement was willful. 19 Similarly, willful was defined as a 
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty" and 
found absent when an infringer misunderstood the law and 
made single copies of videotapes for rental, while keeping the 
originals in a vault as "insurance."20 
The legislative history of the 1992 amendment shows an 
intent that the standard for willful remain high, so as to ex-
empt from criminal liability parties whose "civil liability is 
unclear-whether because the law is unsettled, or because a 
legitimate business dispute exists."21 The legislative history 
16. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020·21 (7th Cir. 
1991) (Civil case). 
17. !d. 
18. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1987) (sustained on 
sufficient evidence, but reduced to a misdemeanor for failure to prove the volume 
of copying required by the old 18 U.S.C. §2319(b)(3)). 
19. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 1976). 
20. United States v. Moran, 757 F.Supp. 1046, (D. Neb. 1991) (quoting Cheek 
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (defming willfulness as "voluntary, in· 
tentional, violation of a known legal duty" in the context of tax fraud, but holding 
that doubts as to the validity of the law were irrelevant if the law was actually 
known)). 
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specifically refers to reverse engineering22 as an area of copy-
right law that remains unsettled. 23 Since legal expert testimo-
ny and the prior opinion of counsel should both be admissible 
on the issue of willfulness, it should be quite difficult to suc-
cessfully prosecute anyone for unauthorized reverse engineer-
ing· of software. Another area where the law is unclear and 
proving willfulness will be difficult is violation of shrinkwrap 
"licenses."24 Where the law is unclear, the "known legal duty" 
required for willfulness can not really be "known." 
Willfulness is easier to prove where the law is definite, as 
with infringers who buy one copy of software and install it for 
simultaneous use on multiple machines in a business or an 
educational setting, or with infringers who produce illicit copies 
for sale. 
With this high standard, the willfulness element will be a 
hotly contested point in any felony copyright infringement trial. 
The mens rea required for criminal copyright violation is quite 
different from that required for most crimes; this is an area of 
the law in which ignorance of the law may be an excuse! 
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent to Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.,25 implies that prior registration of the copy-
right in a work is not a prerequisite for criminal liability for 
infringing copyright in that work. A copyright registration cer-
tificate is, however, generally introduced into evidence during 
trial in cases involving criminalliability.26 
C. Prior Registration of Copyright 
Copyright registration certificates are readily obtained at 
minimal cost, even long after publication. Should the copyright 
owner be unwilling to cooperate with the prosecutor and refuse 
to obtain a certificate, the defense would argue that the owner 
has dedicated his work to public use and no infringement ex-
ists. 
In a civil context, suit for copyright infringement has been 
upheld although the copyright registration was not filed until 
22. Reverse engineering is the process of studying a program or device in 
order to understand how it works. 
23. House Report, at 3573-74. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 6lto 67. 
25. 464 U.S. 417, 492-93 n.44 (1984). 
26. See. e.g .. United States v. Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1984) (10 
copyright certificates introduced into evidence). 
----
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after the infringing work was published, nine years after the 
initial publication. 27 Long delays, such as thirteen years before 
filing a registration for copyright of a song that became very 
popular in the interim (implying dedication to public use 
through knowing acquiescence in infringement by John Philip 
Sousa, among many others) have been held to produce an aban-
donment of the copyright.28 
D. Number of Copies, and Works Infringed 
The statute requires that ten or more copies be made for 
felony penalties to attach. Most computer software as distribut-
ed consists of several distinct "files," or separately manipulable 
sub parts, recorded on one or more media. An entire set of 
these files is likely to be a single infringing copy by analogy to 
Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly (holding that each 
performance of a musical was a violation, but not a separate 
violation of the copyright in each song in the musical).29 
While evidence is required that the copies reproduced or 
distributed are copies of one or more copyrighted works, it is 
not necessary to perform an electronic comparison of the copies 
and the original works to verify exact identity.30 
The legislative history on the quantity and value require-
ments for felony penalties says that the quantity test was 
adopted with an intent to exempt the incidental copying of 
games by children. 31 The legislative history also shows belief 
that these requirements exempt reverse engineering of comput-
er software, an intent missed due to a misunderstanding of the 
manner in which reverse engineering is likely to be conducted 
in a professional environment. 32 Reverse engineering has, how-
27. Ziegleheim v. Flohr, 119 F.Supp. 324 (D.C. N.Y. 1954) (photographic copy-
ing of 415 pages of a Jewish prayer book which had a notice of copyright). 
28. Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co., 48 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass. 1942), 
aff'd 139 F.2d 398 (1st Cir. 1943) cert. denied, 322 U.S. 730 (The Caissons Go 
Rolling Along). 
29. 530 F.2d 1096, 1104 (2d Cir. 1976). 
30. See e.g., United States v. Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1984). 
31. House Report at 3574. 
32. The author is a computer architect and has been a professional program-
mer. Although his personal experience with reverse engineering is limited to hard-
ware, he believes that a much larger volume of copies would be made than does 
the House committee. In any professional environment, copies would be made 
through performing: I 
a. a weekly backup of all files on the system, kept for months, 
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ever, been held to be a fair use, and thus not an infringe-
ment. 33 Whether the copies reproduced be paper copies of 
books or magazines, or of computer software, the threshold of 
ten copies is easily reached. 
E. Retail Value 
Most computer software carries a high list price, but sells 
through mail order discount houses and other retailers at a 
much lower price. Much software is available with educational 
discounts. As "retail value" is not provable by the introduction 
of manufacturers' suggested retail or "list" prices,34 evidence 
of actual selling prices of the original work must be used to 
prove that retail value exceeds $2500. Discounted prices of 
bootleg copies is probably immaterial, as it has been held im-
material for purposes of sentencing under the old statute.35 
The threshold of $2500 will be readily reached and proved 
in cases of infringement of computer software; many packages 
are priced high enough that if the threshold of ten copies is 
reached, the value requirement has also been met. The require-
ment for $2500 in value will be more difficult to reach with 
books and magazine articles. A teacher who distributes a pack-
age of fifteen magazine articles, valued at one dollar each, to 
the students in a class would have to distribute 167 packages 
to reach this threshold. 
F. Purpose for Commercial Advantage 
or Private Financial Gain 
The element of a purpose of commercial advantage or pri-
vate financial gain has been very broadly defined, including 
copying for internal use to avoid payment for sufficient legal 
c. a disassembly listing would be created and maintained on the system, 
U. frequent loading into memory (a copying) for execution with breakpoints under 
the control of debugging software. 
33. R. T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 2d ed. 1992 §1.16 
Supp. 1993 citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 1992 Westlaw 
217828 (Fed Cir. Sept 10, 1992). 
34. United States v. Willis, 322 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1963) (holding the retail 
value of goods transported in interstate commerce is not adequately proven by 
evidence of manufacturer's list prices for the goods). 
35. United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992) (conviction 
of trafficking in 1670 counterfeit videotapes) (holding that application of sentencing 
guidelines to normal retail price, and not to a discounted bootleg price, was cor-
rect). 
152 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1994 
copies. Actual financial gain is not required for a criminal copy-
right infringement conviction; "[i]t is only necessary that the 
activity be for the purpose of financial gain or benefit."36 The 
cases frequently refer to "commercial advantage or private fi-
nancial gain" as meaning for profit-the language of an older 
version of the statute.37 For profit was broadly interpreted as 
"in the hope of some pecuniary gain," with the actual realiza-
tion of any gain, and whether checks were made payable to a 
business or to an individual being irrelevant.38 It has been 
held that high volume sales are sufficient evidence of a profit 
motive, irrespective of whether the defendants actually made a 
profit.39 The profit element of felony copyright infringement is 
not restricted to cases where the copies reproduced are sold; for 
profit could also be found where the illegal copies are simply 
used by the infringer in order to avoid the payments required 
to obtain more legal copies. From this analysis, copying for the 
following purposes would be covered by this statute, as for 
"commercial advantage or private financial gain": 
a. Production of copies of software packages for sale. 
b. Loading of a single copy of software onto several machines 
used in a school or business to avoid payments required to 
obtain the required number of legal copies. 
c. Loading of software, on which royalties are not paid, onto 
machines intended for sale; intending to lure customers away 
from other sellers who must sell at a higher price because of 
the royalties they must pay. 
d. Failing to erase software from a used machine, as an en-
ticement to a buyer when the machine is sold, while copying 
the software onto a replacement machine. 
e. Selling packages of copied magazine articles to students. 
36. United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing United 
States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979)) (hootleg copies at a videocas-
sette rental operation). 
37. 17 U.S.C §104, prior to the recodification of the copyright act in 1976, 
read "[A] any person who willfully and for profit shall infringe any copyright se-
cured by this title, or who shall knowingly and willfully aid or abet such infringe-
ment, shall be guilty of ... " United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1185 (9th 
Cir. 1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 929. 
38. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 1977) (cert. denied 
434 U.S. 929, (quoting United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 
1974) aff'd 540 F.2d 961 cert. denied 429 U.S. 1124)). 
39. U.S. v. Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1984). 
1 
1 
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G. Copyright Infringement 
Violation of an exclusive right of the copyright owner con-
stitutes the tort of copyright infringement, and is required for a 
criminal copyright infringement conviction. These exclusive 
rights include those of public display; reproduction (copying); 
making derivative works; distribution to the public by sale, 
rental, lease, or lending; and of public performance. 
This section is intended as a brief overview of what could 
be infringement. Emphasis will be placed on those areas of the 
law which remain unsettled, but could arise in a criminal con-
text or which relate to concerns shown in the press. This sec-
tion on what constitutes copyright infringement is a survey, 
and is not intended to be in any way exhaustive. 
Civil law interpretations of the exclusive rights, together 
with their exceptions and limitations, generally govern criminal 
copyright infringement. 40 Please note that there is no longer a 
requirement that works carry a copyright notice for copyright 
to exist in the work. Further, every criminal copyright infringe-
ment action can also produce a civil action. 
1. The fair use doctrine 
Originally an equitable doctrine, the doctrine of fair use 
was codified in 17 U.S.C §107.41 This statute provides a list of 
factors to consider in determining whether an unauthorized use 
or copying of a copyrighted work is a fair use, and thereby 
excused from liability for infringement, including: 
a. The nature and character of the use, including whether the 
use is for profit, or whether the use is for educational purposes, 
b. The nature of the copyrighted work, 
c. The size of the portion of the original work that is used, 
d. The effect of the use on the market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.42 
The fair use doctrine is typically invoked to excuse from 
copyright infringement a critic who quotes from a book or play 
in a review thereof, worshipers who perform without charge a 
copyrighted song in church,43 or students who copy one or two 
40. Cross, 816 F.2d 297 at 303. 
41. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1988). 
42. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1988). 
43. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 506 F. Supp. 1127, 
1133 (N.D. Ill.1981) (also finding copyright misuse through an illegal tying arrange-
ment under the antitrust laws). 
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articles while writing a paper. It may, however, also apply to 
cases in which a profit motive existed.44 
With computer software, the fair use doctrine can be appli-
cable to copying for backup purposes, reverse engineering, or 
loading software onto two machines where no simultaneous use 
results, but where 17 U.S.C. §117 does not apply.45 While fair 
use is more readily found in an educational setting than other-
wise, a 24 page "learning activity package" incorporating eleven 
pages of a copyrighted thirty-page booklet, for example, is not 
fair use.46 
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act47 in-
cludes some guidelines as to when fair use exists. These guide-
lines prohibit copying of consumable materials for classroom 
use, as likely extinguishing the market for the original work. 
Subject to many restrictions, low quantities of brief extracts of 
non-consumable materials may be copied for classroom use if 
"[t]he inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment 
of its use for maximum effectiveness are so close in time that it 
would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for 
permission."48 
Fair use is considered a mixed question of law and fact. 
Such questions require a court to derive first a standard of law 
and second to apply it to the facts of the case. Mixed questions 
are entitled to a broad standard of review on appeal.49 A good 
faith argument that the infringement should have been con-
sidered a fair use will weigh heavily upon willfulness. 
44. "[T]he mere fact that a work may produce pecuniary gain for its author 
or publisher is not dispositive of a claim of fair use." New Era Publications Intern. 
ApS. v. Carol Pub. Group, 729 F.Supp 992, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd 
in part on other grounds 904 F.2d 152 (1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 297 (1991), 
(unauthorized biography of Science Fiction writer and Church of Scientology found-
er L. Ron Hubbard, containing excerpts of the author's works; biography is antago-
nistic to the Church of Scientology; injunction to prohibit publication granted, but 
reversed by higher court). 
45. R. T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 2d. ed. 1991 §1.16 & 
Supp. 1992. 
46. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983). 
47. House Rep. No. 94-1476, reprinted at 17 U.S.C.A. §107 at 111 (West, 
1977). 
48. ld. at 114. 
49. Pacific & Southern Co., Ind. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11 Cir. 
1984) reh'g denied 749 F.2d 733 cert. denied 105 S.Ct. 1867, on remand 618 
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2. The library and archive exception 
Nonprofit libraries and archives enjoy certain exemptions 
from the copyright act. For example, the nonprofit rental, lease, 
or lending of software or of a phonorecord by a nonprofit li-
brary is permitted.50 This exception would apply to lending by 
most school libraries. 
3. Section 117 exceptions for software 
The owner of a copy of software has some rights to copy 
and adapt the software under 17 U.S.C. §117.51 Copying is 
specifically allowed for backup purposes and where necessary 
to run the copy of software on a computer. The statute does not 
specify the number of legal backup copies that may be made, 
but does prohibit retention of backup copies when the underly-
ing copy of the software is transferred. 
4. The first sale doctrine 
Many cases under the old criminal copyright statute list 
the "absence of a prior 'first sale' "52 as an element of criminal 
copyright infringement. This is a misnomer, since the first sale 
doctrine actually goes to the issue of infringement, and arises 
from 17 U.S.C. §109.53 
50. 17 U.S.C.A. §109 (2)(A). 
51. 17 U.S.C.A. §117 (West Supp. 1993) reads as follows: 
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer Programs 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or 
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that comput-
er program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an es-
sential step in the utilization of the computer program in 
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other 
manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes 
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event 
that continued possession of the computer program should 
cease to be rightful. 
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions 
of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, 
along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, 
only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights 
in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred 
only with the authorization of the copyright owner. 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1977). 
53. 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (1988) reads: "notwithstanding the provisions of section 
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If the allegedly infringing copy or copies involved in a crim-
inal prosecution for copyright infringement actually originated 
and were sold by (or with authorization from) the copyright 
owner, a first sale will be held to have taken place. The re-
quirement that the government prove an absence of a first sale 
is implicit when the alleged infringement involves unautho-
rized vending of copyrighted material. 54 When first sale has 
occurred, no copyright infringement has taken place although a 
breach of a contract has likely taken place. 55 A civil action may 
lie for breach of the contract against the initial purchaser of 
the copy. 
Much computer software is sold with shrinkwrap license 
agreements which purport to retain title to the copy of the 
enclosed software. This ploy is intended to avoid the first sale 
doctrine and allow the vendor to apply restrictions on resale, 
use, and copying that go beyond the limitations of 17 U.S.C. 
§109 and 17 U.S.C. §117.56 
Proof of lack of a first sale may be made by tracing possible 
sources of the copies in question, or by showing that the copies 
were made without authorization from another copy. 57 Physical 
differences between authorized copies and the copies in ques-
tion has been held evidence of the absence of a prior first sale. 58 
A reasonable belief of a defendant that the copies in ques-
tion were legitimate would negate the high standard of willful-
ness, and prevent conviction, even if the copies were illegiti-
mate. 
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this 
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of 
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord." 
54. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 
929, reh'g denied 434 U.S. 977, (interpreting a version of the criminal copyright 
statute, 17 U.S.C. §104, in effect prior to the 1976 recodification of the copyright 
act). 
55. ld. at 1189-90 citing Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., (2d Cir. 1894) 
(damaged bound and unbound books sold as scrap paper, but later appeared on the 
market); and lndep. News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961) (comics 
sold as scrap paper, but later appeared on the market). 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 6lto 67for a discussion of such "agree-
ments." 
57. See, United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that 
evidence showing that a particular film had never been authorized for production 
in videocassette form was sufficient evidence of a lack of first sale for copies in 
videocassette form, especially given the total absence of evidence that the tapes 
were legitimate). 
58. United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991). 
r 
l 
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Concern about the potential impact on the software indus-
try of illegal copying done by those who rented or borrowed 
copies of software led to the addition of 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(1)59 
as amended in 1990. This statute requires authorization from 
the copyright holder for the rental, leasing, or lending of com-
puter software or phonorecords for direct or indirect commer-
cial advantage by any party other than a nonprofit educational 
institution or library. The statute excepts from its coverage 
software embedded in a product and software for use with 
limited purpose game machines. 
17 U.S.C. §109(b)(4)60 allows only civil enforcement of the 
prohibition of rental, leasing, or lending of legitimate copies of 
software and phonorecords. Criminal prosecution is prohibited 
unless other acts of infringement have occurred. 
5. License or sale? 
When a copy is licensed, rented, or leased by a copyright 
holder instead of being sold; the "first sale" doctrine of 17 
U.S.C. 109,61 and the copy owner's rights under 17 U.S.C. 117 
may not apply.62 State contract law will determine whether an 
effective license contract has been formed. 
When the purchaser of software has signed an agreement 
stating that he has purchased only a license, and that the copy 
is still owned by the vendor according to the terms of that 
agreement, the transaction is likely the purchase of a license. 
When software is sold over the counter at retail, where the 
package contains a license agreement that the purchaser has 
59. (Supp. 1992). 
60. 17 U.S.C. l09(B)(4) (Supp. 1992) reads: 
Any person who distributes a phonorecord or a copy of a computer pro-
gram . . . in violation of paragraph (1) is an infringer of copyright under 
section 501 of this title and is subject to the remedies set forth in sec-
tions 502, 503, 504, 505, and 509. Such violation shall not be a criminal 
offense under section 506 or cause such person to be subject to the crimi-
nal penalties set forth in section 2319 of title 18. 
61. "The evidence demonstrated ... that ISC did not sell copies of its software 
to its customers, it only licensed them, making the 'first sale' doctrine inapplica-
ble." I.S.C. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ill. 
1990). 
62. David L. Hayes, Proprietary Rights, Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New 
Light on a Vexing Problem, PRENTICE HALL LAW AND BUSINESS, Sep. 1992. 
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not had an opportunity to read before placing his money on the 
table, the transaction may in fact be the sale of a copy.63 
Shrinkwrap agreements have been held to be ineffective in 
at least one case involving a suit for breach of warranty, where 
the form disclaimed all warranties.64 It is even less likely that 
the shrinkwrap agreement is effective between the software 
vendor and an individual end user, since these are also addi-
tional terms to the contract. The argument can be made that 
since these terms are not visible on the exterior of most soft-
ware packaging, are clearly not the product of negotiations 
between the parties, often contain unreasonable terms, and are 
at best a concealed adhesion contract, they do not have any 
effect whatsoever against an end user. 65 
Since a reasonable doubt exists that shrinkwrap licenses 
contained within a software package, or the boxtop66 variation 
held ineffective in Step Saver Data Systems v. Wyse Technolo-
gy,67 are indeed effective, a defendant can probably avoid the 
willfulness requirement for acts prohibited in such a license 
but permitted when a sale of a copy has occurred under 17 
U.S.C. §117. Willfulness would also be obviated in these cir-
cumstances if the defendant had obtained and adhered to an 
opinion from counsel. 
6. The licensed copying defense 
Some reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works is 
done under license from the copyright holder, and is lawful. 
The prosecution need not prove that allegedly infringing copies 
could not possibly have been licensed copies. "If the accused in-
fringer has been licensed by a licensee of the copyright owner, 
that is a matter of affirmative defense."68 
63. "Whether the license form becomes part of an enforceable contract in such 
conditions can be doubted." R.T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, 2d 
ed. 1992 §7.24[1] at 7-86. 
64. David L. Hayes, Supra. citing Step Saver Data Systems v. Wyse Tech-
nology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the additional terms of the 
shrinkwrap agreement had not become a part of the actual contract under the 
Uniform Commercial Code §2-207 (as adopted by Georgia and Pennsylvania) be-
cause they were a material alteration of the sale contract established by the ac-
tions of the parties and lost out in the "battle of the forms") (Applicable specifically 
to transactions between merchants). 
65. David L. Hayes, Supra. 
66. The license held ineffective in Step Saver was apparently printed on the 
exterior of the package. 
67. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
68. United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992); See also, 
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H. Statute of Limitations 
17 U.S.C. §50769 prescribes a three-year statute of limita-
tions for both civil and criminal copyright infringement actions. 
In civil cases, this has been held to mean three years from the 
time the copyright owners became aware of the infringement. 
Indeed, the cases show that the period may run from the last 
retail sale of maps sold by an infringer at wholesale where the 
infringer did not make efforts to remove the infringing product 
from the market. 70 
IV. POTENTIAL DEFENDANTS IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 
Persons liable for criminal copyright infringement include 
those who manufacture copies, those who cause or control the 
manufacture of copies, those who distribute copies, and those 
who knowingly aid and abet the infringement of a copyright. 
This could include teachers, principals, secretaries, copy center 
employees, and any commercial copy shop involved in infring-
ing a copyright. 71 
While the language of the statute has changed since some 
of the old cases under former 17 U.S.C. §104 (which mentioned 
aiding and abetting specifically, while the current 17 U.S.C. 
§506 does not); coverage of those who aid, abet,72 command, 
induce, or procure a criminal act is present elsewhere in the 
code: 
§2. Principals 
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or 
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its com-
mission, is punishable as a principal. 
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if direct-
ly performed by him or another would be an offense against 
the United States, is punishable as a principa1.73 
United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991). 
69. 17 u.s.c. §507 (1988). 
70. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983). 
71. See, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (civil liability of copy shop for infringing copyrights in producing 
course packets). 
72. See, United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1986) (conviction for 
aiding and abetting copyright infringement involving 18 U.S.C. §2(a) and for con-
spiracy involving 18 U.S.C. §371). 
73. 18 u.s.c. §2 (1988). 
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Similarly, co-conspirators are also covered by general sec-
tions of the code: 
Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States: 
If two or more persons conspire either to commit an offense 
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or 
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and 
one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of 
the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object 
of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for 
such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment 
provided for such misdemeanor.74 
V. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY 
The one party who might be immune from prosecution for 
copyright infringement is the school district. 75 Some recent 
cases, including BV Engineering v. University of California, Los 
Angeles,76 have held that a state agency can not be sued in 
federal court for copyright infringement unless the state has 
waived sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
Whether the state has waived sovereign immunity is a question 
of state law and will vary from state to state. As federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction in copyright cases, inability to sue a 
state in federal court effectively immunizes a state from liabili-
ty. 
Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment requires a find-
ing that a suit is being brought against a state; and does not 
apply to private schools. Political subdivisions of a state also do 
not get the state immunity.77 In some states school districts 
are local subdivisions which may be liable, 78 while in other 
states school districts are immune state agents.79 Sovereign 
74. 18 U.S.C. §371 (1988). 
75. Withol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (11th Cir. 1962) (holding school district im-
mune from copyright infringement suit). 
76. 858 F.2d 1394, (9th Cir, 1988). 
77. "Municipalities and other political subdivisions of a state are not within 
the scope of [the eleventh amendment]." Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 n.24 
(2d Cir, 1978) (citing, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890)). 
78. "The answer depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity 
created by state law." Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274, 280 (1977) (holding that a school district was not a state agent and was sub-
ject to suit in federal courts). 
79. Martinez v. Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1393 (lOth Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
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immunity, however, will not shield individual employees from 
liability. 80 
VI. OTHER STATUTES UNDER WHICH CONVICTION HAs FAILED 
18 U.S.C. §231481 prohibits the transportation in inter-
state or foreign commerce of any goods by one who knows that 
the goods are stolen, converted, or taken by fraud. In past 
years, attempts were made to use this statute to obtain crimi-
nal convictions against copyright infringers who sold their 
wares in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court shot down 
this tactic in Dowling v. United States;82 reasoning that the lan-
guage of 18 U.S.C. §2314 did not specifically cover copyright 
infringement, and that Congress had made a reasoned decision 
that 18 U.S.C. §2319 should provide the primary criminal pen-
alties for copyright infringement. Three dissenters argued that 
18 U.S.C. §2314 does not require that the stolen goods remain 
in their original form, and that the infringers had reason to 
believe that the term "stolen" could cover an illegally taped 
performance. 
State copyright laws have been preempted by the federal 
laws since 1978.83 For a state criminal action to lie there must 
be something beyond copyright infringement itself, or the work 
must be grandfathered by having been created before 1978, or 
1983 for semiconductors.84 Except in unusual circumstances, 
school district in New Mexico was a state agent and immune from suit because of 
the strong state control exercised by the state over the school district). 
80. The mere fact that her conduct was undertaken in the course of her 
state employment does not of course relieve her of individual liability, 
even if her employer could not be sued for it. A state may no more 
than an individual principal give its agent authority to commit torts 
without civil recourse. 
State law therefore provides no immunity to Brown against a claim 
in her individual capacity, though she may obviously invoke any of 
the numerous defenses that may be available to her under the Act 
itself. 
Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir, 1988) 
(quoting: Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 694 n. 15 
(1948)) (holding state university immune from copyright infringement suit, with 
university official personally liable for damages) (dissent favored holding state uni-
versity liable on grounds that copyright act language overrode the state's sovereign 
i=unity, citing: Johnson v. University of Virginia, 606 F.Supp. 321, 324 
(D.Va.1985)). 
81. 18 u.s.c. §2314 (1988). 
82. 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (interstate transportation of bootleg records). 
83. 17 U.S.C. §301 (Supp. 1992). 
84. 17 U.S.C. §912(c) (1988). 
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a copyright infringer need only be concerned about civil liabili-
ty and the criminal penalties of 18 U.S.C. §2319. 
VII. EVIDENCE FROM CIVIL LITIGATION 
Virtually all copyright infringement leading to criminal 
prosecutions can also lead to a civil infringement action. Poten-
tial defendants in criminal copyright infringement cases are 
cautioned that evidence developed in a civil setting, including 
the existence of a consent decree, will be used against them in 
criminal proceedings. If proof of criminal conduct would arise 
during a civil copyright infringement suit, the time to "take the 
fifth" is during the first action. 
Although one commentator notes that admitting prior civil 
judgments into evidence in subsequent criminal trials may 
violate a defendant's right of confrontation, McCormick on 
Evidence, §318 (1984 ed.), we think that Cohen's consent 
judgment can be characterized better as a personal admission 
properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(A) than as a civil judgment resulting from a jury or 
bench verdict. The question of burdens of proof never arose, 
and only Cohen's consent made the judgment conclusive. We 
have held elsewhere that it is a "familiar rule of evidence that 
any statement by a party may be offered against him by his 
opponent," and here Cohen agreed to be enjoined permanently 
from infringing the plaintiffs' copyrights. . . . The consent 
judgment is analogous to testimony in a prior civil proceeding, 
and the admissibility of such testimony in criminal trials is 
well-settled. 85 
VIII. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have not yet been 
amended to correspond with the changes in 18 U.S.C. §2319. 
Those sentencing guidelines for copyright infringement already 
in existence specify a base offense level of 6,86 with an increase 
from the Fraud and Deceit table87 for violations involving a re-
85. United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991) (The dissent argues 
that the consent decree should have been excluded as an offer to compromise a 
claim under Fed. R. Evid. 408). 
86. Federal Sentencing Guidelines 18 U.S.C.A. App. 4 §2B5.3. 
87. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. App. 4 §2F1.1 (West Supp. 
1993) provides the following adjustments based on the amount of the loss and the 
\ 
----------------------------------------------------r-
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tail value of more than $2000. Further, an increase of from two 
to four levels may be made if the defendant was involved in a 
leadership role. 88 Fairly harsh adjustments are made if the 
character of the offence: 
(1) Loss (apply the greatest) 
(A) $2000 or less 
(B) More than $2000 
(C) More than $5000 
(D) More than $10000 
(E) More than $20000 
(F) More than $40000 
(G) More than $70000 
(H) More than $120000 
(I) More than $200000 
(J) More than $350000 
(K) More than $500000 
(L) More than $800000 
(M) More than $1500000 
(N) More than $2500000 
(0) More than $5000000 
(P) More than $10000000 
(Q) More than $20000000 
(R) More than $40000000 
(S) More than $80000000 
(2) If the offence involved 




















(A) more than minimal planning, or 
(B) a scheme to defraud more than one victim, 
increase by 2 levels 
(3) If the offence involved 
(A) a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a chari-
table, educational, religious, or political organization or a government 
agency, or 
(B) violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or pro-
cess, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offence level is less than level 
10, increase to level 10. 
(4) If the offence involved the conscious or reckless risk of serious bodily injury, in-
crease by 2 levels. If the resulting offence level is less than level 13, increase 
to level 13. 
(5) If the offense involved the use of foreign bank accounts or transactions to con-
ceal the true nature or extent of the fraudulent conduct, and the offense level 
as determined above is less than level 12, increase to level 12. 
(5)If the offence 
(A) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institu-
tion; or 
(B) affected a fmancial institution and the defendant derived more than 
$1000000 in gross receipts from the offense, increase by 4 levels. If the 
resulting offense level is less than level 24, increase to level 24. 
88. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. App. 4 §3Bl.1: 
§ 3Bl.l. Aggravating Role 
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: 
(a)If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that in-
volved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. 
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defendant has any prior convictions. It is likely that the penal-
ties will not become any lighter under the new 18 U.S.C. 
§2319. The value applicable to the sentencing guidelines is 
generally the actual retail value of the infringed product, not 
the selling price of illegal copies.89 Whether available educa-
tional discounts will be taken into account in computing this 
value has apparently not been litigated. 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,90 a first convic-
tion of a person who has never been convicted of any other 
crime is likely to result in the following sentences: 
Level Sentence 
6 0-6 Probation, not a felony, as amount< $2500 
7-8 0-6 months probation or supervised release (felony 
with no factors increasing sentence) 
9 4-10 Months imprisonment, or supervised proba-
tion with intermittent confinement (weekends in 
jail) 
10 6-12 Months, conditions as for (9) 
11 8-14 Months in prison, half of which may be in 
community confinement or home detention 
12 10-16 Months, conditions as for (11) 
13-18 12-18 Months of imprisonment; add 3 months to 
each end of the range for each level beyond 13 
19 30-37 Months of imprisonment 
20 33-41 Months of imprisonment 
21 37-46 Months of imprisonment 
22 41-51 Months of imprisonment 
23 46-57 Months of imprisonment 
24 51-60 Months of imprisonment, term could go to 
63 months if convicted on multiple counts with 
consecutive sentences 
Under the guidelines, the maximum five year sentence 
would be appropriate for a person with no prior convictions 
who organizes a group of five or more members who infringe 
(b)if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or lead-
er) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise 
extensive, increase by 3 levels. 
(c)If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any 
criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. 
89. United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992). 
90. See table at Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. App. 4 Ch. 5 Pt. A. The 
prior criminal record determines which column is used in the table, see 18 
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$5,000,000 or more of materials; or for a person who infringes 
any copyright that was owned by a bank! While a dollar value 
of $5,000,000 is highly unlikely in an educational setting, most 
infringers will not know if the copyright was acquired by a 
bank in settlement of a loan. 
A supervisor of a computer lab having 15 machines, whose 
first offense involves buying one copy of software having a 
value of $800 but loading it on all 15 machines for a total in-
fringement of $11,200 will have a level nine sentence of from 
four to ten months. If the copying was done at the request of 
the school principal, that principal may get a level eleven sen-
tence of from eight to fourteen months. 
Actual sentences for criminal copyright infringement sus-
tained by appellate courts include a year of probation with a 
$500 fine, six months imprisonment with a $3400 fine,91 two 
years probation with a $5000 fine;92 and about a year in pris-
on.s3 
IX. A VOIDANCE OF FELONY LIABILITY IN EDUCATION 
An educational institution may avoid federal felony liabili-
ty for copyright infringement under the amended statute by 
avoiding unauthorized copying, or by avoiding the mens rea of 
willfulness. This likely may be done through creating, follow-
ing, and enforcing a plan to prevent unauthorized copying by 
students, teachers, administrators, and others with access to 
computers and copiers. Such a plan probably should include the 
following elements: 
a. Teaching those with access to computers and copy ma-
chines about their legal and moral responsibility to avoid 
copying, including some definition of the fair use doctrine. 
b. Having the plan endorsed by an attorney. The plan will 
then be admissible as legal advice on the issue of willful-
ness. 
c. Placing copyright reminder notices in computer rooms and 
on copiers. 
91. United States v. Blanton, 531 F.2d 432 (lOth Cir. 1975, amended 1976) 
(before adoption of the sentencing guidelines). 
92. United States v. Malicoate, 531 F.2d 442 (loth Cir. 1975) (before adoption 
of sentencing guidelines). 
93. United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674 (2d Cir. 1992) (conviction 
enhanced from level 6 to sentencing guideline level 13 by value of 2652 counterfeit 
videotapes). 
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d. Establishing someone to serve as a resource for obtaining 
permission to copy from the copyright owners. Many facul-
ty and students have no idea of how to obtain this pennis-
sion themselves. 
e. Periodically auditing the software loaded on school comput-
ers, since the felony retail value threshold is most easily 
reached through unauthorized copying of computer 
software. This audit should ensure, as a minimum, that 
adequate legal copies exist, and that no unauthorized soft-
ware is loaded on the machines. 
f. Auditing any publications and course packets to ensure 
that pennission to copy has been obtained for anything in 
them that might exceed the fair use exception. 
g. Establishing and enforcing some penalty applicable to 
those who ignore or do not follow the policy. 
It must be understood that a court may find civil liability 
for copyright infringement under conditions where criminal 
liability is not found. Civil liability for damages may result 
even if the criminal element of willfulness is lacking. 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
The Software Publisher's Association was the primary 
lobby behind broadening felony copyright infringement by 
amending 18 U.S.C. §2319.94 Computer software is a high val-
ue, easily duplicated item that is frequently copied in educa-
tional, business, and home settings. 
Primarily because of the mens rea requirement of willful-
ness, interpreted as violating a known legal duty, the implica-
tions of the act are not nearly so sweeping as some commenta-
tors in the press have claimed. Infringements which involve 
uncertain aspects of copyright law, such as shrinkwrap licenses 
and reverse engineering, are unlikely to be found will-
ful-especially if an opinion to that effect has been obtained 
from counsel. 
The act does-as intended-pose the threat of substantial 
fines and prison tenns for those who produce or distribute 
large quantities of counterfeit software or who deliberately 
evade purchase of the requisite number of copies in a business 
or educational setting. 
Steven K. Barton 
94. See, Mitchell Kapor, Innocent Felons, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1993, 208. 
